The paper begins by situating transfers within the broader framework of EU law (Section 2) and historical context of transfers (Section 3). The article then examines the ICT Directive's general coverage (Section 4), licensing regime (Section 5), certification (Section 6), end use controls (Section 7), licence withdrawals and suspensions (Section 8) and review and remedies (Section 9) before offering some conclusions (Section 10). It will be argued that by moving from individual licences to general and global licenses, the ICT Directive merely lowers but does not remove barriers to trade. It does not create a "license-free" Europe. Moreover, due, inter alia, to the absence of sufficient harmonisation, many aspects of national laws and practices remain unchanged and largely replicate the treatment of third country exports. Adjustments will be necessary to enable the ICT Directive to meet is objectives.
Armaments under the TFEU
Armaments are goods for the purposes of EU law. 23 It follows that the free movement of goods constitutes the basic framework for determining restrictions to their intra-Community transfer. 24 For instance, it may be argued that licence fees alone constitute charges having equivalent effect to customs duties prohibited by art.30 TFEU. 25 Similarly, licensing requirements that impose significant administrative burdens and long lead times 26 may constitute measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions contrary to art.34 TFEU. 27 However, armaments are subject to art.346(1)(b) TFEU which allows any Member State "to take such measures as it considers 17 See Unisys, 'Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products', Final Report of the Study 'Assessment of Community initiatives related to intra-community transfers of defence products', Brussels, February 2005 (study commissioned for the European Commission) 65 <http://www.edis.sk/ekes/en_3_final_report.pdf> [accessed October 2013] . This is no longer available at the time of writing but remains on file. 18 Impact Assessment, supra note 12, 11-12. necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material […] ". 28 This derogation applies to the Treaty as a whole. In 1958, the Council drew up a list of products to which art.346(1)(b) TFEU applies. 29 Many Member States had interpreted art. 346 TFEU as a categorical exemption of armaments from the scope of the Treaty and acted accordingly when drafting and applying their licensing rules. 30 This, at least, partly explains the late advent of the ICT Directive and the state of affairs discussed in Section 3 below. However, in Spanish Weapons, the ECJ clarified that art.346(1)(b) TFEU does not represent an automatic or categorical exclusion of armaments. 31 As it is a derogation, art. 346(1)(b) TFEU must be interpreted narrowly. 32 Member States must specifically invoke the derogation and prove that a situation justifying its use actually exists. This interpretation was reiterated in a 2006 Commission Interpretative Communication 33 and further refined in subsequent ECJ judgments. 34 As an instrument of secondary EU law, the ICT Directive does not prevent the possibility for Member States to continue to invoke the primary Treaty derogation. 35 However, the ICT Directive aims to harmonise national licensing regimes with the objective to eliminate disproportionate controls of the kind previously imposed by Member States pursuant to art.346 TFEU. 36 Further, even where a Member State considers the need to derogate to impose exceptional licensing measures on essential grounds, the ICT Directive aims to facilitate them within its scope with the objective to limit derogation from the EU Treaties as a whole.
Intra-Community transfers prior to the ICT Directive
For many years, the Commission has prioritised intra-Community transfers alongside procurement, competition, standardisation and export control as areas for the development of an EU defence market. 37 However, there had been no general EU-wide intra-Community transfer regime. Each of 
R. I-11913) and
Finnish Turntables (Insinööritoimisto InsTiimi Oy (C-615/10), n.y.r., 7 June 2012) 35 Recitals 5, 13 and art.1(3) ICT Directive. 36 See the Impact Assessment, supra note 12, at 4: "[t]his patchwork of licensing requirements -and the corresponding administrative burden -clearly appear to be out of proportion with actual control needs", and even more clearly at 13: "Intra-community transfers of defence-related goods hindered by cumbersome and disproportionate procedures".
(emphasis added). 37 See COM (1996) the 28 Member States instituted their own national legislation and policies to regulate the import, export and transit of armaments. 38 As part of an extensive consultation, in 2005, the EU commissioned a study on intra-Community transfers. UNISYS conducted this study based on extensive data collected through questionnaires and structured interviews which revealed significant obstacles to effective internal transfers arising as a result of national licensing regimes. 39 Through national laws, policies and practices, Member States had formally treated the internal transfer of defence products within the EU and their export to third countries without distinction. 40 National ex ante export licences would be required in both instances. 41 To this extent, national rules were not specifically adapted to differentiate EU internal market law obligations and any other legal obligations with regard to export. Thus, measures that might otherwise be appropriate for application where there was a risk of export and diversion to third parties involved in conflict or terrorism were equally applied to transfers to relatively peaceful Member States within an otherwise deeply integrated EU. This situation was criticised in many quarters not least the European defence industries. 42 Whilst it has been suggested that, in practice, export applications to other EU or NATO countries were probably subject to less scrutiny than exports to other third countries, 43 the formal application of variable national export regimes had a number of consequences. According to UNISYS, the simple existence of many different laws was, in itself, "a serious burden for intracommunity transfers" resulting in a lack of knowledge on the part of many traders, the absence of a common information system, and language variations, all of which created considerable administrative burdens. 44 The UNISYS study identified numerous barriers to trade. 45 In certain Member States, licences could be obtained for several years whereas in other Member States, licences were required for every single shipment. 46 Time limits for licence expirations also varied. 47 Renewals were often possible but requirements for renewal and the length of permissible renewals also varied. 48 Member States used different armaments lists to determine the scope of coverage of licences, 49 often containing idiosyncratic modifications to reflect national laws and cultures. 50 This also meant that companies had to comply with variable regimes when transferring components between subsidiaries located in several countries. 51 Most national laws did not specify detailed or transparent licensing criteria. 52 Determinations were, therefore, at the absolute discretion of licensing authorities. 53 Further, the allocation of responsibility was not always clear. 54 More than one body could be designated with licensing approval responsibility and, in many cases authorities were obliged to consult with others prior to approval. 55 This could result in a need to obtain multiple additional licenses. 56 Stages in licensing procedures also varied. 57 Moreover, certain national laws required that additional (pre-)licenses be obtained or a fee paid before export/import/transit licenses could be approved. 58 Finally, the processes for certifying reliable defence exporters were also based on varying national practices. 59 These issues resulted in significant administrative burdens for companies, generating long lead times, in some cases up to several months. 60 On the basis of available evidence, it is difficult to assess the indirect costs. 61 According to UNISYS, the estimated direct costs for the 12,627 licences procedures conducted in 2003 amounted to €238 million. 62 In 1998, the European Defence Industries Group ("EDIG") estimated their direct costs for export control measures at €107.1 million or 0.22 per cent of annual turnover of defence related activities. 63 The 2007 Communication A Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry reported "red tape" costing industry €400 million per year.
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These costs are rendered even more stark when it is considered that licences were rarely refused. According to UNISYS, 12,627 license applications were made in 2003 for conventional defence products delivery between the then 25 EU Member States, with an overall value of €8.9 billion. 65 This represents approximately 31.4 per cent of all transfers, with the remainder being exports to third countries. 66 Out of this total, only 15 licences were refused, all in the Baltic States.
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There were no refusals anywhere else in the Union, including in the 'Big Six' major defence producing Member States. This provides a clear indication that disproportionate licencing regimes were not justified in light of limited internal control needs. 68 Based on the findings of the UNISYS study, in 2006, a public debate was launched with a Consultation Paper. 69 This precipitated the 2007 Impact Assessment 70 and proposal for a Directive. 71 The Impact Assessment had considered alternatives, including taking no action, various licence and certification combinations and even a centralised EU licencing agency. Most of these alternatives will be discussed below to the extent otherwise considered viable. The status quo was rejected due to the perceived disadvantages: the continued fragmentation of the market along national lines, the delay of necessary defence industry consolidation, the risks of discrimination between operators covered by intergovernmental regimes outside the EU and other EU operators, the difficulty of integrating Small and Medium Sized Enterprises ("SMEs") from new Member States in supply chains, the gradual technological decline as the critical mass of industries remained insufficient, the progressive exclusion from the highest value-added market segments, and, finally, the resulting erosion of competitiveness, sanctioned by loss of market share in both EU and third countries.
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Until the ICT Directive, transfer licences had only been the subject of one serious intergovernmental initiative, namely the 1998 Letter of Intent ("LoI"), to which an exclusive number of EU Member States are currently signatories. 73 The LoI created a Framework Agreement, one objective of which was to simplify transfer licences. 74 Attempts were made inter alia to introduce the 'Global Project Licence' which was designed to remove the need for specific authorisations to destinations permitted by the licence between LoI partners participating in collaborative projects.
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The co-existence of supranational EU law and intergovernmental LoI initiatives may become increasingly contentious as the speed of harmonization continues to vary between Member States. Whilst it has been observed that the LoI proposals have not been fully executed in practice and with limited results, 76 the LoI remains an important forum for consultation not only for Member States seeking greater harmonization than is currently provided by the ICT Directive but as a means to further inform and influence the future development of the ICT regime. 77 For instance, art.1(4) ICT Directive appears to acknowledge the continued possibility for Member States to pursue and further develop intergovernmental cooperation whilst complying with provisions of the Directive. 78 Similarly, art.4(3)(c) ICT Directive provides for a Member State or the Commission to add intergovernmental cooperation as one of the circumstances which are exempt from a requirement of prior authorization. However, from an EU law perspective, EU Member States may not confer powers to organisations outside the EU which have already been conferred to the EU as this would inter alia violate the loyalty clause in art.4(3)TEU. 79 The ICT Directive now confirms Internal Market competence in the field of intra-Community transfers and licensing. Therefore, it is likely that any framework outside this instrument can only be used after a successful invocation of art.346(1)(b)TFEU which is likely to be extremely limited for the reasons indicated in the preceding Section. Therefore, it is submitted that while Member States may exceptionally impose specific requirements for transfer licenses which result from policies determined within organisational frameworks outside the EU, general and abstract licensing regimes outside the TFEU are difficult to reconcile with EU law. Moreover, the limited membership of the LoI risks potential discrimination against excluded Member States which may, in turn, dis-incentivise their efforts to cooperate.
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Member States must invoke art.346 TFEU to exempt licensing requirements that do not comply with the ICT Directive, the permitted circumstances for which are likely to be highly exceptional. This apparent tension should be kept firmly in mind when considering the extent to which the ICT Directive strikes an effective balance between the internal harmonization objective and the continuation of intergovernmental initiatives outside this framework.
Having considered several policy options, the Commission opted for a Directive rather than a Regulation based on the "primary responsibility" of Member States for simplification of licencing and the general sensitivity of defence. 81 On 6 May 2009, the ICT Directive was adopted. Member States were given until 30 June 2011 for transposition. 82 However, national provisions did not have to enter into effect until 30 June 2012, allowing for a period of deferral in which to "foster mutual trust". 83 In 2012, the Commission published a Transposition Report. 84 According to the Report, twenty Member States had transposed the ICT Directive fully, one had transposed partially, six Member States expected transposition in 2012 and one had not communicated transposition. 85 The Commission initially launched infringement proceedings for non-communication against seven Member States. 86 At the time of writing in 2015, the ICT Directive has been formally transposed by all Member States. 87 4. General coverage of the ICT Directive Art.1 ICT Directive identifies its aim to simplify the rules and procedures applicable to intraCommunity transfers of defence related products. 88 At the outset, it is important to acknowledge, therefore, that the ICT Directive does not purportedly affect Member State policies regarding the transfer of defence-related products 89 nor discretion as regards policy on export of defence related products. 90 An overarching concern, which has not been fully acknowledged, is the extent to which it is possible to fully realise the ICT Directive's harmonisation and simplification objectives given that Member States continue to retain competence to determine policy not only on intra-Community transfers but also exercise discretion in relation to export control policy. This paper does not address the legal compatibility or coordination of these regimes. However, as the very least, fundamental issues of respective competences signal a further tension that the ICT Directive may either exacerbate or reduce to a degree which remains uncertain.
Scope
According arts.2 and 3(1), the ICT Directive applies to defence-related products. 91 These are set out in its Annex, which must correspond with the EU Common Military List ("CML") 92 97 The Annex should be identical to the CML at all times but the procedure for amendment of the Annex has, in practice, taken at least seven months followed by a further transposition of the amendment by Member States. 98 Thus, the Annex does not fully correspond to the CML for at least seven months of the year. The Commission therefore considers it necessary to simplify the procedure for aligning Annex and CML. 99 Secondly, Member States ultimately determine the type of products covered by a licence prescribed under the ICT Directive. 100 Thus, there is a risk that some Member States may adopt a very short list of products or relevant lists of products may vary thereby prohibitively discouraging use of the ICT regime. Therefore, the success of general transfer licences under the ICT Directive may depend, to a significant extent, on how Member States define their scope.
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These concerns are confirmed by the GRIP Report. 102 According to GRIP, the danger of short lists appears to be a lesser problem but Member States practice in defining the scope of lists in terms of products covered "varies greatly […] and patterns are difficult to establish". 103 While many Member States use the CML as a reference point, national exclusions lead to significant differences. 104 Certain other Member States use their own lists or different lists for different general transfer licences. 105 Member States also appear to define the scope of their general transfer licences case-by-case and based on factors such as the recipient in question, the sensitivity of the product, risk assessment and diversion risk. 106 This apparent 'diversity' of scope is further exacerbated by the lack of consensus between Member States as to how to define or classify "sensitive" products which legitimate their exclusion from the scope of a general licence. 107 In terms of the practical effects, GRIP identifies a lack of "visibility and clarity" of different national lists, 108 To this extent, it is argued that the ICT Directive should include a harmonised list of covered products using the CML as an already widely used reference point with clearer correspondence to the Wassenaar List. 111 Ideally, a harmonised list would be comprehensive and based on a common understanding of "sensitive products" that should be definitively included or excluded from the list. As will be discussed below, the ICT Directive has already sought to define the "sensitivity of transfer" in relation to components.
112 However, as the GRIP Report has observed, it appears impossible at this stage to recommend a detailed list of categories of sensitive or defence-related products to be excluded that would be accepted by all Member States. 113 Therefore, The GRIP Report recommends that a positive or minimum list should be adopted.
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Whilst it must be acknowledged that such an approach could result in the "lowest common denominator" this could, at least, reduce routine exclusions. Several Member States and companies have called for the feasibility of such a list "while taking into account national limitations". 115 It is unclear whether a revised ICT Directive would need to include specific provisions identifying precisely what these "national limitations" are. If so, the ICT Directive could similarly ensure that these national limitations are not applied to circumvent the objectives of the ICT Directive. At the very least this would increase clarity and thereby encourage the use of general transfer licences in practice.
Transfers
A fundamental innovation of the ICT Directive is the qualitative differentiation of transfers from exports so that the former can no longer be treated as generally equivalent to the latter through disproportionate controls. Whilst all Member States enjoy relatively sustainable peace and security, there are crisis regions in many third countries. Transfers to the former do not generally involve the same political and strategic concerns as exports to the latter, necessitating a lighter regime to facilitate an Internal Market for armaments. The ICT Directive now provides for a legal definition of "transfers" and does not define the term "exports". Article 3(2) ICT Directive defines a 'transfer' as "any transmission or movement of a defence-related product from a supplier 116 to a recipient 117 in another Member State".
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Whilst as indicated below, a transfer will generally be subject to prior authorisation, no further authorisation must be imposed on an authorised transfer for "passage through".
119 "Passage through" is defined as a "transport through one or more Member States other than the originating and receiving Member States". 120 Similarly, no further authorisation must be imposed for entrance 111 The GRIP Report, supra note 19 at 63 places particular emphasis on design of the List based specifically on the Wassenaar List. onto the territory of a Member State where the recipient is located. 121 Crucially, however, the prohibition on further authorisation is without prejudice to provisions necessary on public policy or public security grounds such as, inter alia, the safety of transport.
122 A Recital to the ICT Directive also refers to safety of storage, the risk of diversion and the prevention of crime. 123 According to the Transposition Report, no Member State which had transposed the ICT Directive permits passage and entrance licences other than on the basis of the above exceptions contained in the ICT Directive. 124 The Report is not unequivocal in this regard. For instance, it states that Germany will require a general licence for entrance and passage licences only for "war weapons". 125 The Netherlands will adopt a "previous notification system". 126 Hungary will require passage licences for certain categories of products and maintain entrance licences. 127 The above suggests that the legal basis for imposing prior authorisation for passage through and the types of measures used continues to remain unclear. It is submitted that a revised ICT Directive should clarify these grounds to enable a further degree of harmonisation.
Transfer licences
The ICT Directive facilitates the progressive replacement of individual ex-ante control through strict licensing of internal transfers by instituting a broader licensing regime containing reduced controls which are also compensated through ex-post monitoring. 128 However, in light of opposition by both Member States and most of industry to the alternative of a European "licence-free zone", 129 the ICT Directive continues to subject transfers to at least some prior authorisation through 'transfer licences' which, for the reasons explained in Section 4.2 above, must be distinguished from 'export licences'. 130 The Impact Assessment identified two principal reasons for retaining a licensing regime. The first concerns the relative infancy of a common foreign policy and "uneven levels of trust" concerning the extent to which certain external borders are capable of maintaining sufficient control. 131 The second concerns the incompatibility of total liberalisation with existing national and EU commitments in the field of international control regimes.
132 Therefore, licensing was still considered necessary as a "vehicle" to carry possible re-exportation limitations. 133 Importantly, this further reinforces that export control continues to be an equal, if not overriding, concern in the ICT Directive's design.
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Before and after the adoption of the ICT Directive, three types of transfer licence were, and continue to remain, in place for both intra-Community transfers and exports of armaments: general, 121 Article 4(1) ICT Directive. 122 130 Recital 16 and art.4(1) ICT Directive. Art. 3(5) ICT Directive defines a 'transfer licence' as: "an authorisation by a national authority of a Member State for suppliers to transfer defence-related products to a recipient in another Member State." Art. 3(6) ICT Directive defines an 'export licence' as: "an authorisation to supply defence-related products to a legal or natural person in any third country." 131 Impact Assessment, supra note 12, at 24. 132 Ibid. identifying Wassenaar and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Also acknowledged in Recital 28 ICT Directive. 133 Impact Assessment, supra note 12, at 24-25. 134 As the GRIP Report, supra note 19 observes at 60: "Member States have used the opportunity given by the Directive to impose specific restrictions in their general transfer licences in order to maintain the coherence of their arms export control policy." global, and individual. 135 According to the Transposition Report, all Member States who had transposed the ICT Directive incorporated all three types of licence.
136 Whilst retaining the same general categories of licence, the significant point of departure for the ICT Directive is an attempt to change the type of licence predominantly used in practice away from restrictive individual licences towards broader general licences.
Licence exemptions
Before examining each type of licence, it should be emphasised that art.4(2) ICT Directive provides that Member States may exempt five forms of transfer from prior authorisation. Exemptions are an important feature in determining the ICT Directive's scope given that Member States retain the option whether or not to provide for these exemptions in their transposition. 137 These circumstances also provide preliminary indications as to potential future areas in which a license free space may be possible. 138 The first two circumstances are where the supplier or recipient is a governmental body or part of the armed forces and where the EU, NATO, the International Atomic Energy Agency or other intergovernmental organisations send supplies in the performance of their tasks.
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Whilst supplier or recipient status as a governmental body or armed forces does not automatically eliminate security and export diversion risks, these risks are likely to be limited in transfers between allies in comparison to transfers where the supplier and/or recipient is a private economic operator. The Transposition Report indicates that not all Member States have transposed or made use of this exemption. 140 It is submitted that the ICT Directive should be amended to provide that such transfers are mandatorily excluded from prior authorisation, perhaps subject only to exceptional use of a general licence (unless a further justification can be provided for use of global or individual licences) on a public policy or security ground. As will be discussed below, art. 5(2)(a) ICT Directive prescribes the mandatory use of the general licence subject to prior authorisation in similar circumstances. The stated rationale appears to be to "greatly increase security of supply". 141 However, it is suggested that whilst a general licence may provide a formal guarantee of security of supply, an unrestricted transfer provides optimal security of supply for operational efficiency without need for a formal guarantee. Exceptional recourse to a general or other licence for such transfers could then provide for a formal guarantee of security of supply but only where absolutely necessary.
A third exemption concerns a transfer necessary for the implementation of a cooperative armament programme between Member States. 142 The importance attributed to cooperative programmes under the Defence Package is reflected in the provisions of both its Directives. The Defence and Security Procurement Directive contains a specific provision permitting the exclusion 135 Impact Assessment, supra note 12 at 4. See also art. 4(4) ICT Directive. 136 Citation. 137 H. Ingels, "The Intra-EU Defence Trade Directive: Positive Goals" in Alyson J. K. Bailes, Sara Depauw, and Tomas Baum (eds.), The EU Defence Market: Balancing Effectiveness with Responsibility (Flemish Peace Institute: Brussels, 2011), 61, at 65. 138 Article 4(3) ICT Directive further provides for the Commission on its own initiative or at a Member State's request to amend the Directive to exempt three additional circumstances: (1) where the transfer takes place under conditions which do not affect public policy or public security, (2) where the prior authorisation obligations have become incompatible with Member States' international commitments subsequent to the Directive's adoption, and (3) where the exemption is necessary for intergovernmental cooperation. According to this provision, these measures are designed to amend "non-essential elements" of the Directive and must be adopted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in art.14(2) ICT Directive. 139 Article 4(2)(a) and (b) ICT Directive. 140 Transposition Report, supra note 18, at 6. of cooperative programmes based on research and development ("R&D") from its contract award procedures to ensure flexibility when procuring under, and executing, such programmes. 143 An exemption from prior authorisation for transfers is broadly consistent with this objective. Again, however, similar to the armed forces exemption, a question arises as to whether such transfers should not be subject to prior authorisation through licencing subject to exceptional use of a general or other licence only on public policy or security grounds One difficulty is that the ICT Directive may seek to differentiate between forms of cooperative programme. For instance, in contrast to possible exemption of cooperative armament programmes between Member States from prior authorisation, art.5(3) ICT provides that a Member State may publish a general transfer licence where Member States participate in an "intergovernmental cooperation programme concerning the development, production and use of one or more defence-related products". Any prima facie distinction is exacerbated by the fact that either form of cooperative programme could fall within the classification of the other.
Notwithstanding, under a revised ICT Directive, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish forms of cooperative programme which could be presumptively excluded from prior authorisation subject to authorisation in exceptional cases and those forms of cooperation which may prima facie be subject to prior authorisation or not at the option of Member States. For example, cooperative armaments programmes involving common purchases off-the-shelf equipment are not particularly complex 144 and could fall within the former category. By contrast, cooperative programmes involving R&D could fall within the latter category. This would align cooperative armament programmes based on R&D with intergovernmental cooperation programmes currently subject to optional prior authorisation and which, in light of their "development" component are likely to share certain similarities in this regard. This also corresponds to the fact that the ICT Directive already envisages that a Member State or the Commission may request an amendment to the ICT Directive to add intergovernmental cooperation to one of the five categories exempt from prior authorization discussed above. 145 At present, whilst the ICT Directive attempts to offer relative flexibility between no prior authorisation and mandatory or optional minimum prior authorisation, it appears ambivalent as to how to approach these circumstances. This is exemplified by the vague provision stating that mandatory publication of general licences is "without prejudice" to the provisions enabling optional exemption. 146 Whatever the approach, the starting principle should be against prior authorisation to the extent possible.
A fourth exemption is where "the transfer is linked to humanitarian aid in the case of disaster or as a donation in an emergency."
147 In addition to enabling expeditious transfer, references to disasters and donations suggest that the material in question will not raise major security concerns. This exemption is also consistent with the EU's humanitarian obligations. 148 The final exemption is where the transfer is necessary for or after repair, maintenance, exhibition or demonstration. 149 This exemption reflects a level of risk commensurate with the generally more limited capability of a product at the pre-production stage or that a product may have already been subject to licensing requirements after initial production. 144 This is further reflected in the fact that contracts awarded under such programmes must generally be awarded in accordance with the Defence and Security Procurement Directive (in contrast to cooperative programmes based on R&D) under art.13(c) Defence and Security Procurement Directive. 145 Article 4(3)(c) ICT Directive cited supra note 139. Curiously, art.4(3)(c) cross-references to art.1(4) ICT Directive which simply provides that Member States must ensure that suppliers wishing to transfer may use general, global or individual licences in accordance with the provisions which govern each type. 146 Article 5(2) ICT Directive. 147 Article 4(2)(d) ICT Directive. 148 Articles 4(4) ICT Directive and 208-211 TFEU. 149 Article4(2)(e) ICT Directive.
States have made use of this exception. 150 According to the Transposition Report, out of the twenty Member States who had already fully implemented the ICT Directive in 2012, thirteen had used the first exception; eleven had used the second exception; twelve had used the third exception and nine had used the fourth exception.
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While GRIP is silent on this matter, it can be said that although certain Member States have been prepared to formalise these exceptions, the combined effect of optional exclusions which have not been adopted by all Member States further inhibits the potential for harmonisation.
Licences under the ICT Directive
Member States are free to determine the appropriate choice of licence. 152 However, for reasons that will be explained in the remainder of this paper, the ICT Directive signals a clear emphasis on general transfer licences as the least restrictive. For the purposes of the ICT Directive, a general transfer licence is a specific authorisation granted to suppliers established in one Member State to perform transfers of defence-related products to be specified in the general transfer licence to categories of recipients located in another Member State. 153 The main distinguishing feature is that a Member State must publish it directly, granting authorisation to a supplier fulfilling its terms and conditions without requiring a specific request for each individual transfer. 154 Prior to the adoption of the ICT Directive, Member States, with the notable exception of the United Kingdom, did not provide for extensive use of general licences. 155 Thus, the ICT Directive has largely adopted the British model. 156 The Commission had considered a regime exclusively comprising the general transfer licence.
157 Whilst this regime could have minimised bureaucracy and significantly improved security of supply, such a regime was not considered acceptable EU-wide. For Member States with only limited defence industries, the costs of issuing general transfer licences might exceed those for individual licenses. 158 More importantly, the general transfer licence is not suitable for all types of equipment especially the most sensitive items. 159 Deprived of any flexibility in the use of other licences, Member States might have also sought to invoke art.346 TFEU thereby taking licensing outside the scope of EU law, undermining the ICT Directive's objectives. Whilst the ICT Directive therefore is a compromise also permitting use of global and individual licences, , the introduction of general transfer licences is an innovation offering at least the theoretical possibility for reduced administrative burdens and improved security of supply.
Circumstances requiring general licences
Article 5(2)(a)-(d) ICT Directive identifies a list of "at least" four circumstances in which publication of a general transfer licence is mandatory. To this extent, the ICT Directive envisages 150 use of general licences in a wider range of circumstances.
160 Some Member States have published general transfer licences for other types of transfer, for example, in France for transfers to the police, customs, border guards, and coast guards. 161 A revised ICT Directive could further expand the list of circumstances for mandatory publication of a general transfer licence.
The first circumstance under art.5(2)(a) is where the recipient is part of a Member State's armed forces or a defence contracting authority, purchasing for the exclusive use by that Member State's armed forces. 162 The general rationale for this circumstance has been discussed above in relation to optional exemption from prior authorisation. 163 The second circumstance under art.5(2)(b) is where the recipient is certified in accordance with the ICT Directive's certification provisions. 164 Certification is examined further below. The third and fourth circumstances under art.5(2)(c) and (d) respectively are where the transfer is made for the purposes of demonstration, evaluation or exhibition or for the purposes of maintenance and repair if the recipient is the original supplier. It is recalled from the discussion on optional exemption from prior authorisation above that this provision reflects the level of risk attending pre-and post-production transfers. It is therefore questioned whether the control needs in such circumstances justify even a general licence. It is submitted that these circumstances could rather be the subject of exclusion from prior authorisation unless exceptional circumstances justify prior authorisation.
Additionally, it is recalled that art.5(3)ICT Directive provides that Member States participating in an intergovernmental cooperation programme may publish a general transfer licence for transfers necessary for the programme's execution. 165 According to the Transposition Report, some Member States have transposed this option. 166 Prior to the adoption of the Defence Package, the use (albeit limited) of general transfer licences was most common in cooperative programmes between larger countries, in particular, signatories to the LoI FA. 167 As indicated in Section 4.4 above, a revised ICT Directive may retain the option for Member States to require prior authorisation for transfers in intergovernmental cooperation programmes through the use of general licences but subject to certain clarifications in terms of scope of application.
Beyond the intended savings in terms of administration and cost, the mandatory use of general licences is also intended to have a specific impact on defence procurement, particularly on improving the ability of an EU economic operator's to provide a comparable guarantee of security of supply to that of a domestic economic operator when tendering for a defence contract. For instance, art23(a) Defence and Security Procurement Directive provides that in order to ensure security of supply, a contracting authority can require a tenderer to demonstrate that it will be able to honour its obligations regarding the export, transfer and transit of goods associated with the contract. It is usually the case that at the time of tender preparation, the authorisation to transfer 160 Some indication is provided in Recital 25 ICT Directive which states: "[m]ember States should be able to publish further general transfer licences where the risk for the preservation of human rights, peace, security and stability is very low in view of the nature of the product and the recipients. 161 Arrêté du 6 janvier 2012 relatif à la licence générale de transfert dans l'Union européenne de produits liés à la défense à destination de la police, des douanes, des gardes-frontières et des gardes-côtes d'un Etat membre dans un but exclusif d'utilisation par ces destinataires, JORF n°0008 of 10/01/2012, at 419. For other types of general licence identified as used in a range of Member States, see GRIP Report supra note 00, 19-22. 162 See also Recital 22 ICT Directive which refers to the role of general transfer licences to "greatly increase security of supply" to armed forces. Security of supply is discussed in more detail below. 163 Section 4.4. above. 164 Article 9 ICT Directive concerns the certification of recipients of defence-related products, on which see below. See also Recital 23 ICT Directive. 165 Recital 24 and art.5(3) ICT Directive as discussed in Section 4.4 above. 166 Transposition Report, supra note 18, at 6. According to the Grip Report, supra note 19 at 19, the Flemish Region and Spain have published general licences on intergovernmental cooperation, in the latter case, concerning transfers which are the result of the participation of the Spanish Ministry of Defence and Spanish companies in its activities and operations of NATO and its agencies. 167 UNISYS, supra note 17, 15. The LoI FA is discussed in Section 3 above and which is not to be confused with the global project licence under that initiative. equipment will not yet have been granted, thereby possibly raising questions in some instances as to the non-domestic economic operator's ability to guarantee security of supply. 168 The Guidance Note on Security of Supply published to assist in the transposition of the Defence and Security Procurement Directive 169 suggests that this uncertainty is now removed in light of possible recourse to general transfer licences which will have already been published with the necessary authorisation.
170 However, the United Kingdom has indicated that whilst general transfer licences should provide some degree of security of supply, they can be withdrawn or granted with end-use restrictions that may continue hinder security of supply.
171 More fundamentally, it may be questioned to what extent security of supply can be guaranteed whatever licence is used an issue which the ICT Directive itself cannot fundamentally resolved. Notwithstanding, it is submitted that the ICT Directive could at least contribute significantly to enhancing security of supply through widespread uptake and use of general licences.
Licence terms and conditions and conditions for registration prior to first use
The ICT Directive contains general provisions applicable to all types of transfer licences with regard to their terms and conditions. For instance, it is recalled from Section 4.1 that visibility and clarity in the use of general licences has been affected by 'diversity' in the conditions imposed by Member States on the users of their general transfer licences.
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Article 4(6) provides that Member States shall determine all the terms and conditions of transfer licences, including any limitations on the export of defence-related products to persons in third countries. In this regard, Member States can "avail themselves of the possibility to request end-use assurances, including end-user certificates. 173 According to the GRIP Report there are several types of limitations on re-transfer and re-export. These include: non-re-export clauses in the licence itself imposing a total ban on export outside the EU or an obligation to ask for consent of the Member State of origin, or even a separate non-re-export certificate. 174 In this regard, certain Member States have exempted certain exports to allied third countries, EEA, NATO or other relevant intergovernmental organisations. 175 It is submitted that there is scope for harmonisation in a revised ICT Directive by introducing a standard form of export limitation and one list of 'allied countries' for all Member States.
Similarly, according to art.4(7), Member States shall determine the terms and conditions of transfer licences for components on the basis of an assessment of the sensitivity of the transfer.
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The ICT Directive does not define 'components' but does prescribe two criteria according to which the sensitivity of the transfer is determined. The first is the "nature of the components in relation to the products in which they are to be incorporated and any end-use of the finished products which might give rise to concern". 177 The second is the "significance of the components in relation to the products in which they are to be incorporated".
178 Whilst the GRIP Report is silent on these potentially subjective criteria, it is recalled from Section 4.1 that the GRIP Report identified the difficulty of reaching a consensus on the issue of "sensitive" products for the purposes of the lists used for coverage of general licences. It may therefore be inferred that there is likely to be 168 Guidance Note Security of Supply, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/guidesos_en.pdf [accessed 18 August 2015], at 10 169 There is no comparable Guidance Note for the implementation of the ICT Directive although it must be observed that the issuance of such guidance is rare. 170 Guidance Note Security of Supply, supra note 168, at 10. 171 The Defence and Security Public Contract Regulations, Chapter 12 -Security of Supply, 7, para. 38. 172 GRIP, supra note 19, at 38. 173 ibid. 174 Ibid. 33. For instance, the French certificate de non-reexportation en dehors de la l'UE-CNR. 175 Ibid. citing the UK, Walloon, Estonia, Luxembourg, Spain, the Flemish Region and Denmark. 176 See also Recital 18. 177 Article 4(7)(a) ICT Directive. 178 Article 4(7)(b) ICT Directive. considerable variation regarding national assessments of the sensitivity of transfers with regard to components. According to art.4(8), where Member States do not consider the transfer of components, Member States must refrain from imposing export limitations for components where the recipient provides a declaration of use to the effect that the components are or will be integrated into its own products and cannot subsequently be transferred or exported except for maintenance or repair. 179 According to the GRIP Report, general licences may incorporate integration clauses or declarations, or statements certifying to this effect. 180 Certain Member States have used these sorts of statements as an alternative to the non-re-export clause discussed above, 181 probably because their industries only produce parts to be integrated into larger systems.
In addition to these conditions, general licences may incorporate technical clauses requiring either the supplier or the recipient to make specific alterations to the product before shipping it.
182
General licences may also incorporate specific conditions attached to each category of product under the licence in the form of the clauses discussed above. 183 It is submitted that in order for the functions and use of general licences to be optimised, such licences must be subject to the fewest specific terms and conditions possible. A revised ICT Directive could contain a provision which provides an illustrative list of the types of permissible terms and conditions. A Recital could indicate the types of terms and conditions which are to be generally discouraged or which have been used only by a limited number of Member States such as technical clauses, for example.
Finally, general licences may include a host of other obligations. For example, even before granting a general licence, art.5(4) provides that a Member State is permitted to lay down the conditions for registration prior to first use. 184 Therefore, Member States retain considerable discretion to define procedures for registration and de-registration, the latter of which is not mentioned at all in the ICT Directive. Further, art. 8(2) also provides that Member States may determine additional information that may be required regarding products transferred under a general transfer licence prior to first use. Certain Member States may therefore require more detailed information than others. Other requirements include: informing certified recipients about the existence of specific restrictions and conditions; 185 notification to the national authority prior to first use of the licence, 186 to keep records of each transfer under the licence 187 including reporting requirements to be determined by Member States. 188 It is submitted that most, if not all, of these conditions appear excessive and are susceptible to variable national applications. However, the lack of harmonisation of these requirements in a first iteration of ICT Directive could be considered sensible in respecting differences in administrative practice and other priorities between the Member States at this transitional stage. A shift from individual transfer licences to general licences in practice is an ambitious objective, would constitute a major success, and needs time. However, the data provided by GRIP indicates that national differences in the use of variable conditions has 179 See also Recital 19 180 GRIP, supra note 19, at 36. 181 ibid Walloon Region, Flemish Region and Luxembourg. 182 Ibid., at 36, although the GRIP Report only identifies the use of this clause in France. 183 GRIP, supra note 19, at 37, although, again the GRIP Report only identifies the use of this practice in France. 184 In the UK, for example, most Open General Export Licences ("OGEL's") require the exporter or trader to register with the Export Control Organization ("ECO") before they make use of them and registered companies are subject to compliance visits from the ECO to ensure that all the conditions are being met. See Lundmark report, supra note 9, at16. 185 Recital 31 and art.8(1) ICT Directive. Ibid. 37-38. 186 Article 8(2) ICT Directive. According to the GRIP Report, this is often accompanied by an obligation to prove that the user of the general licence is authorised to manufacture and trade in equipment which, the GRIP Report identifies as seeming to be automatically introduced in the general licence (with France reserving the right to call potential suppliers for a preliminary interview). In most cases, notification means registering with the national authorities to await confirmation of notification prior to shipping the product. 187 Article 8(3) and (4) ICT Directive. 188 Article 8(3) ICT Directive. GRIP, supra note 19, at 37. According to the Report, these reporting requirements can be seen as creating a new "administrative burden" on the user of the general licence which could contribute to the current limited use of the general licences. The Report indicates that Germany is the only Member State requiring an electronic 'zero-report' when there were no transfers under the general transfer licence during the reporting period. impacted on the regime and which may require more detailed harmonization through a revised ICT Directive.
In addition to the specific issues discussed above, GRIP made a number of general observations regarding the implementation of the general transfer licence regime in practice. First, general licences are often difficult to access or not available through the official websites of the relevant national authorities and are regularly only published in the respective national language. 189 Second, the number of general transfer licences in the Member States varies, while some have published one or several of the mandatory circumstances, not all Member State use them for all four circumstances; some Member States are still in the process of preparing their first such licences, and others have not published any. 190 Third, there appears to be no specific documentary format. For example, some general licences comprise only one page while others comprise a complex series of documents.
191 A revised ICT Directive can address issues such as the publication of general transfer licences in English 192 and possibly a common format or template for licences in the form of a "European General Licence Document". User-friendly websites can be established by softer means, such as seminars, guidance notes or information exchange. As discussed in Sections 4.4 and 5.1 above, the circumstances mandating and permitting use of general licences is a more complex issue that would require more extensive consultation informed by observation in practice.
Global transfer licence
According to art.6(1) a global transfer licence is a specific authorisation granted in response to an individual request to transfer products to authorised recipients in one or more other Member States. Again, Member States must determine the products or categories of products covered and the authorised recipients. 193 The Commission opted against a 'global licences only' scenario on the basis that a combination of general and global licences would enable use of general licences for routine non-sensitive transfers while at the same time accommodating the necessary flexibility for more sensitive transfers through global licences. 194 According to the Commission, the main simplification potential of the global licence is that it is not specific to a precise shipment and, thus, can be used several times to cover similar transfers. Further, global transfer licences are typically not subject to quantitative limits and are valid over a long period. 195 Global transfer licences are said to be particularly helpful in cases of routine shipments to habitual customers or for SMEs with a limited catalogue. 196 Their potential has already been realised in certain Member States. 197 In 2002, France introduced global licences based on a catalogue of participating companies, specifically targeting SMEs. 198 The first 35 licences replaced 1,250 individual licences, a reduction in administrative bureaucracy by a ratio of 36. 199 Similarly, during the ICT Directive's preparatory phase, Romania indicated that it had replaced 700 individual licences with 7 global licences. 200 Whilst the Commission has emphasised the simplification potential of global licences, it is submitted that the ICT Directive expresses ambivalence as to the intended role of global licences under this regime and which may reflect the view that global licences are intended merely as a 189 GRIP, supra note 19, at 19. 190 Ibid., at 19-20. 191 GRIP, supra note 19, at 20.
192 At 63, GRIP recommends that general licences should be published and accessible in a common language such as English which could ease the decision-making process to become certified. transitional measure until general licences are fully operational. 201 Notwithstanding, this does generate uncertainty in the short-medium term, assuming that global licences are also likely to continue to feature in a revised ICT Directive. For instance, whilst the ICT Directive does not adopt a formal prioritisation of licenses by reference to any defined criteria, the ICT Directive at the very least prescribes circumstances in which general licences and individual licences are required or permitted. By contrast, whilst it is clear that the ICT Directive generally views global licences as a 'second best' option, the ICT Directive does not prescribe any circumstances in which a global licence could be used. Rather, a Recital simply states that "[w]here a general transfer licence cannot be published, Member States should, upon request, grant a global transfer licence […] except in the case set out in this Directive […]" Further, according to the ICT Directive a global licence must be granted for a period of three years but may be renewed. 202 It is open to debate whether or not the global licence period should be set higher or lower than 3 years. However, arguably more significant is the fact that the ICT Directive does not prescribe a minimum or maximum period of renewal, an issue which, it is recalled from the Unisys Study discussed in Section X, has proven to result in variable national practices. A revised ICT Directive could, at the very least, provide an illustrative list of circumstances in which a global licence must or could be used. This would bring the global licence provision into closer conformity with the general format of the general licence and individual licence provisions. Further, a revised ICT Directive could determine a minimum and/or maximum period of renewal. The Commission could also issue additional guidance on these matters.
While the introduction of the global transfer licence through the ICT Directive is likely to have more limited impact on Member States already using general licences, it is estimated that the regime would reduce red tape by a factor of 10 where newly introduced and by 50 per cent overall within the EU. 203 The Commission has acknowledged a small risk that Member States may define global licences in such restrictive terms as to be equivalent to individual licences, but states that there is little reason to fear such abuses as a Member State would compromise the competitive position of its industries for no reason. 204 However, this does presuppose that competition will be a primary determinant when making licensing decisions. The Commission also suggested a risk that Member States already using general transfer licences of backtracking. 205 However, on the Commission's own logic, this could also compromise a Member State's competitive position. Further, there is no indication in countries such as the UK where general licensing is most well established that global licensing has significantly increased.
GRIP reports that according to several stakeholders, global licences could be a useful transition tool until the general licence regime is fully operational. 206 However, extensive use of global licences could also compromise the general licence regime when the former are used in cases more suited to the latter. For example, it appears that recipients favour this type of licence to avoid the perceived burdens of certification. 207 Again, this reinforces the need for a clearer delimitation of the circumstances in which global licences are generally permitted where general licences cannot be used.
Individual transfer licence
As indicated in Section X, prior to the ICT Directive, individual transfer licences were the most commonly used type of licence. 208 In contrast to general and global licences, an individual transfer licence provides a limited authorisation to transfer qualified by quantity of products and the number of authorised recipients. An individual licence concerns only one specific authorisation granted to a supplier at its request, permitting only one transfer of a specified quantity of specified products to be transmitted in one or several shipments to only one recipient. 209 Prior to the ICT Directive, individual licences were typically subject to limited duration, for example, expiring after 12 months or on fulfilment of a specified quantity.
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While individual transfer licences are still possible, art.7 ICT Directive confines their use to four exhaustively defined circumstances: (1) where the request is limited to one transfer, (2) where it is necessary for compliance with international obligations and commitments, (3) where it is necessary for the protection of essential security interests or on grounds of public policy, and (4) where a Member State has "serious reason" to believe that the supplier will not be able to comply with all the terms and conditions necessary to grant it a global transfer licence. The first circumstance is unlikely to be particularly problematic given that the limitation is at the request of the licence user as opposed to being imposed by the Member State. It also appears to be superfluous given that the definition of individual transfer licence expressly states that it only concerns a single transfer. A revised ICT Directive should delete this circumstance. The second circumstance reflects the ICT Directive's general approach to ensuring Member State compliance with other international obligations and commitments. 211 However, invocation of this circumstance is likely to be subject to certain implied limitations such as the need for international obligations to exist at the time of transfer and use of an individual licence must be necessary.
The third circumstance aims to address national security interests inside the ICT Directive thereby limiting the need to invoke arts.36, 52 and 346 TFEU.
212 This is comparable to many of the security based adaptations in the Defence and Security Procurement Directive. 213 However, the reference to public policy is not defined. Recital 14 refers to safety of transport, safety of storage, the risk of diversion and the prevention of crime as public policy grounds. As indicated in Section X, the breadth of these grounds is likely to require careful judicial scrutiny of the necessity of the decision to use an individual licence.
The final circumstance further reinforces an attempt by the ICT to institute a hierarchy of licences but, again, without providing a clear basis on which to guide national authorities in differentiating between use of a global licence and an individual licence. For instance, it is not clear what "serious reasons" may justify use of an individual transfer licence. As essential national security concerns are already accommodated in one of the other circumstances discussed above, a question arises as to what serious reasons other than those related to national security could exist in an armaments transfer context. It appears that such reasons are likely to concern lesser security reasons than "essential" security or serious non-security reasons or combination thereof. An inability to comply with export limitations is likely to be capable of constituting a sufficiently "serious reason". Further, whilst a "serious reason" appears to require a substantial justification, this may be weakened by the fact that the authority only has to "believe" that the supplier will not be able to comply. There is also a difficulty in verifying or evidentially substantiating any reason given. In addition, there is no provision enabling authorities to determine whether the imposition of alternative terms or conditions could allow for the use of a global transfer licence. Therefore, it is submitted that this circumstance could be susceptible to abuse undermining the effectiveness of the ICT Directive as a whole. It is therefore suggested that a revised ICT Directive should delete this circumstance or, at least, clarify its definition with additional safeguards. In any event, based on an analogous interpretation of the existing ECJ jurisprudence on exceptions under the TFEU, it is 209 Article 7 ICT Directive. 210 UNISYS, supra note 17, at 14. 211 Recital 7 ICT Directive. 212 See also Recital 14 ICT Directive. 213 Trybus, "The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: limitation, flexibility, description, and substitution", supra note 8 and, more extensively, in Buying Defence and Security in Europe, supra note 8, chapters 6-10.
argued that these circumstances have to be interpreted narrowly. 214 Whilst the continued availability of individual licences poses a risk to the successful transition to general licences, the decision to retain individual licences must be put into perspective. Firstly, an ICT Directive would have been unlikely to have garnered sufficient support for its passing had it not permitted at least the possibility of the exceptional use of individual licences. 215 Secondly, individual licences are only allowed in four exhaustively defined circumstances and which could be further reduced through appropriate deletion and revision of at least one circumstance. Thirdly, the inability to grant an individual licence under the ICT Directive might have lead Member States to grant the same outside the ICT Directive by invoking art.346 TFEU. 216 Finally, retention of the use of individual licences may offer an opportunity to study their effects in more detail. In principle, there can be no objection to individual licences if they serve a legitimate function in practice.
It should be observed that the GRIP Report did not focus extensively on individual licences but reported continuing use and validity of existing individual licences. 
Certification
The second major innovation of the ICT Directive is the introduction of a certification regime. A particular concern is the reliability of recipient companies of intra-Community transfers of armaments in, particular, in respecting limitations on re-exports outside the EU. 218 To the extent that reliability can ever be formally demonstrated or guaranteed, certification can contribute to addressing these concerns. Certification involves the formal assessment of the reliability of a company receiving products by the Member State in which it is registered before any transfer to that recipient company takes place. This is designed to facilitate the building of mutual trust between Member States as it is said to reduce the risk of illicit transfers and enhance the traceability of products transferred under general transfer licences and thus incentivise their use. A key component of mutual trust is mutual recognition. Consequently, art.9(6) ICT Directive provides that Member States must recognise any certificates issued in another Member State. It should be observed that certain Member States had already operated their own national certification or equivalent systems. 219 However, an EU-wide certification regime based on common principles and mutual recognition requires a fundamental overhaul of existing national processes.
Having considered two other options, the legislator decided to establish a regime based on optional rather than mandatory certification. 220 A significant argument against mandatory certification concerned the diversity of national defence industries. The manageable but still considerable costs of certification make the economic trade-offs decisive.
221 A large system integrator situated in one of the Big Six defence producing Member States is likely to benefit from certification on a cost-benefit analysis. For instance, a Recital to the ICT Directive has indicated that transfers within a group of undertakings should benefit from a general transfer licence in cases where the members of the group are certified in their respective Member States of establishment.
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By contrast, for an SME with only limited activities in the military market, certification is likely to 214 See the case law in supra notes 31, 32 and 34. 215 Impact Assessment, supra note 12, at 36. 216 Ibid. 217 GRIP, supra note 19, 20. 218 Recitals 33 and 34 ICT Directive. 219 For example, French companies must obtain a "licence for manufacturing and trading -autorisation de fabrication et de commerce" whilst United Kingdom companies are invited to implement a "compliance programme for exporters". See Impact Assessment, supra note 12, 37. 220 Impact Assessment, ibid., at 26-27 and 37-40. 221 Data collected during the consultation phase also from stakeholders suggests that there would be annual costs of about €10,000.00 per company if that company is already certified under ISO9001: Impact Assessment, supra note 12, at 38-40. 222 Recital 32 ICT Directive.
incur disproportionate costs, in particular, given fewer transfers. Optional certification provides an incentive to grant the "least burdensome" licence to companies of now certified reliability, through the "additional guarantees pertaining to certification" which result from general licences. 223 The ICT Directive also recognises that, ultimately, it should be for undertakings to decide whether the benefits of general licences and certification justify the effort. 224 As will be discussed below, concerns continue to be prevalent amongst SMEs as to the perceived risks in relation to certification, although concerns are not exclusively confined to SMEs, suggesting that as yet untested risks continue to create a sense of inertia as to whether the uptake of licensing and certification will yield benefits that outweigh the costs.
According to art.9(1) ICT Directive, Member States must designate competent authorities to certify recipients of defence-related products on their territory under general transfer licences published by other Member States. This requirement corresponds to one of the mandatory circumstances in which a general transfer licence must be issued and which was discussed in Section X above. 225 The 20 Member States who had implemented the ICT Directive in 2012 had attributed the role of certification authority to different institutions ranging from the ministry of defence to ministries of industry or the economy. 226 The fact that in several Member States it is not the ministries of defence in charge of these acts was also an argument against the adoption of a transfer regime under the auspices of the European Defence Agency ("EDA") which is seen as an agency of Member States' ministries of defence.
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Article 9(2)(a)-(f) ICT Directive provides that certification must establish the recipient's reliability on the basis of prescribed criteria which appear to be exhaustive, any addition to which could potentially compromise the objective of harmonising certification based on common criteria. These criteria are: (1) proven experience, taking into account, in particular, the undertaking's record of compliance with export restrictions; (2) relevant defence industrial activity, in particular capacity for (sub)system integration; (3) the appointment of a senior executive personally responsible for transfers and exports; (4) a written commitment of the recipient that it will take all necessary steps to observe and enforce conditions relating to the end-use and export of any specific component or product received; (5) a written commitment that it will provide detailed information in response to requests and inquiries concerning the end-use(rs) of all products exported, transferred or received; and (6) a description of the recipient's internal compliance programme or transfer and export management system. Whilst none of the above criteria appear to be disproportionate to their objective, it is difficult to discern to what extent such criteria are any lighter in their touch than reliability assessments concerning exports.
In order to ensure a further degree of convergence in the ICT Directive's application, the Commission issued Recommendation 2011/24 which sets out further common certification guidelines. 228 It is suggested that the absence of comparable licensing guidance could be indicative of the priority accorded to certification as the primary control mechanism. However, it is open to question whether the ICT Directive should have included more detailed certification provisions within the text of the Directive to reflect this status. The Commission probably became aware of the need for more detailed interpretation during the transposition period to which a non-legally binding instrument is a practical response in the interim before the ICT Directive is reassessed in 2016. However, it will need to be considered whether a revised ICT Directive should delete the Recommendation and incorporate more detailed substantive provisions drawing on the Recommendation to the extent necessary. Otherwise, co-existence of a legally binding and nonlegally binding instrument may further compromise the harmonisation and simplification objectives.
Article 9(3)(a)-(d) ICT Directive prescribes the minimum mandatory information to be contained in certificates. Recommendation 2011/24 provides a standard certificate template specifying the contents of the certificate in accordance with art.9(3) ICT Directive. However, it should also be observed that certificates may also contain further conditions relating to the provision of information required to verify compliance with the reliability criteria and concerning suspension or revocation of the certificate. 229 Further, the validity of a certification must not exceed five years. 230 In addition, authorities must monitor the recipient's compliance at least every three years. 231 It appears, therefore, that there is a risk that Member States may vary in terms of additional conditions imposed as well as issuing certificates for less than five years and exceeding the minimum three year compliance monitoring requirement.
If a competent authority determines that a certified recipient on its territory is no longer compliant, it must take "appropriate measures", which may include revoking the certificate. 232 . It follows that measures other than revocation may be used. Whilst the ICT Directive contains limited references to the possibility of suspension, it does not specify any other appropriate measures. Recommendation 2011/24 is slightly more specific, although does not specify which kinds of measures may be more or less appropriate in relation to certain instances of non-compliance. For instance, Recommendation 2011/14 states that when non-compliance is of "minor importance", the authority should require the recipient to take "corrective action" within a specified period.
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Uncertainty in determining what might constitute an instance of non-compliance and appropriate action may also have the consequence that authorities simply opt for automatic revocation or suspension, irrespective of the gravity of the violation and the possibility of less severe corrective action. There is no mechanism in the ICT Directive for Member States to achieve a relative degree of uniformity in approach, other than an obligation to inform the Commission and other Member States of the decision taken. 234 When deciding whether to lift a suspension, Recommendation 2011/24 specifies use of the same measures identified for verifying implementation of corrective measures, namely site visits, meetings with senior officers or inspection of written documentation. 235 Within one month of its verification, the authority must issue a new decision confirming that the suspension will be lifted, maintained pending further verification, or that the certificate is revoked. Again, this could potentially result in variable national treatment and enforcement.
According to art.9(8), Member States must publish and regularly update a list of certified recipients and inform the Commission, the European Parliament and the other Member States. Further, the Commission must make publicly available on its website a central register of recipients certified by Member States. EU's list of certified recipients and several Member States specifically require the supplier to verify, on the EU website, whether the beneficiary holds a valid certificate. 238 It is submitted that either a guidance note or a revised ICT Directive could specify that all references should refer to the EU list of certified recipients. Modifications to the overall design and update of CERTIDER would also be a necessary addition to improve information content. 239 According to the Transposition Report, the 20 Member States that had fully transposed in 2012 have put in place the framework to certify recipients as well as appointed competent authorities, established reliability criteria, "in general" foresee mutual recognition of certificates in their national legislation, and instituted the mechanisms to monitor compliance with the certification criteria and apply the necessary corrective measures. 240 Beyond formal transposition of certification regime however, GRIP reports a limited impact on certification practice in the Member States. 241 Only a small number of companies were certified in 2014 and the generally slow pace of the publication of general licences suggests that the certification regime lacks visibility.
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Stakeholders from the Member State governments and from both certified and non-certified companies interviewed by the GRIP study team or responding to its questionnaire saw the certification regime as a step in the right direction but expressed "serious doubts" about the practical benefits of certification, in particular given the time, risks in terms of intellectual property, security breaches and negative findings, and organisational and financial requirements necessary to prepare procedures, controls and audits for compliance, especially for SMEs. 243 This includes the risks of assigning personal responsibility to any one individual in the form of a senior executive. 244 Further, the consequences (in particular legal) for a company of not being certified were considered unclear. 245 In addition, the lack of visibility and availability (in English) of general transfer licences in all Member States had a negative impact on the certification process, in particular, in light of the general complexity of general licences, their scope of application and requirements for certification which do not appear to be harmonised notwithstanding Commission Recommendation 2014/24/EU and which require additional criteria, different lists and processes. 246 It appears therefore that four main and interrelated factors have limited the use of the certification regime and, therefore, its impact in practice. Firstly, the certification process is perceived to create cost and risk, especially where the recipient is an SME. 247 Secondly, even if it is possible to estimate the known costs and risks, there are potentially unknown costs and risks, for example, the legal consequences of certification or non-certification and any exposure to liability, for example, within the organisational structure of a recipient company. Thirdly, the relative lack of harmonisation and potential for variability in national practices concerning the scope of general licences and the certification criteria create uncertainty. 40 and 44. 244 This had been identified as an increasing issue within the export community as compliance programmes become increasingly mandatory and sophisticated. Thanks to Mr. Ian Bendelow for discussions on this point, although this was not expressed as a UK specific concern. This is also reiterated in the GRIP Report, supra note 19, at 44. 245 Ibid., at 44. 246 GRIP, supra note 19, at 45 . It has been suggested that the language issues have been a predominant factor. Thanks to Mr. Ian Bendelow for discussions on this point. 247 Ibid., at 44. According to the GRIP Report at 46, the administrative burdens and lack of information on general licences lead some SMEs to use individual and global licences in the alternative. 248 Ibid., at 45. This criticism is expressed by the defence companies who participated in the study. The Member States were more cautious due to concerns about the effect of further harmonisation on their national policies on defence transfers.
Recognising the inherent reluctance of stakeholders to trial licensing and certification beyond a preliminary cost/benefit risk assessment, there are various ways in which this situation could be addressed. Firstly, a principal motivation for this article has concerned the relative absence of information and communication on the ICT regime which could be improved, at the Member State and Commission levels. 249 Within the regime itself, greater uniformity of understanding of how the regime functions in practice could be enhanced via publication of general transfers licences in English. Secondly, Member States and prime contractors can use their stronger position as customers of the defence industries to drive more extensive certification down the supply chain. 250 Thirdly, certain changes and adjustments to the regime including Recommendation 2011/24 could be considered as discussed above.
Ultimately, however, it is suggested that certain realities must be accepted which further changes or adjustments to the ICT regime are unable to mitigate. For instance, it is inevitable that certification will introduce a new administrative burden for its users. Further, aside from further standardisation of the permissible scope, terms and conditions of general transfer licences, by nature, licensing is a complex process reliant on the exercise of sound decision-making by users. In addition, Member States with small defence industrial bases cannot expect to derive the same benefits from general licences and certification and cannot, therefore, be expected to use the regime to the same extent. 251 Similarly, certain problems facing SMEs are not specific to licensing but are symptomatic of problems experienced by SMEs in the defence sector generally. 252 It is therefore submitted that even with improved communication, pressure and legislative adjustments, certification and general transfer licences will be used by those companies who can most benefit from them: primes rather than subcontractors, large companies rather than SMEs, and companies from the 'Big Six' rather than those from the other Member States. Within these limits, and with further observation, institutional adaptation and application in practice, it can be assumed that the certification regime will eventually progress towards its objectives with a corresponding impact on the uptake of general licences. Each aspect of the equation inevitably affects the other.
End-use controls: compensatory control of third country exportation risks
As the ICT Directive indicates, and as discussed above, even though Member States cooperate within the framework of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of military exports, the ICT Directive does not prevent Member States from determining all the terms and conditions of transfer licences, including limitations on export. 253 This reflects the fact that Member States have always expressed concern regarding a risk of "re-export" of goods into 'rogue hands', reinforced through existing export control commitments undertaken through international control regimes.
Concerning limitations imposed in licences prior to transfer, according to the GRIP Report, as a result of different regulatory procedures applied to the issue of end-use(r) on a case-by-case basis at the time of authorisation, end-use obligations and the type/format of documentation vary greatly. 254 Most Member States require so called end-use certificates ("EUC") in the context of individual and global licences, although these can have different names and forms. 255 In their EUCs, most Member States refer to the minimum mandatory provisions of the User Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, although there are variations in the formulation of these provisions, in the details of minimum elements required and in the optional elements recommended by the User Guide. 256 It is submitted that there is scope for harmonisation on this issue by means of a common EUC comprising one standard form referring to end-use and based on the User Guide. 257 Further, most Member States include a non-re-export clause. 258 However, the formulations vary between clauses prohibiting re-export with or without the prior written consent of the Member State of origin, with varying lists of 'friendly' countries where written consent for re-export is not required on the one hand and outright prohibitions especially for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons on the other. 259 In case of re-exports to 'friendly' countries the EUC was often replaced by an International Import Certificate ("IIC") certified by the importing country (as opposed to enduser) as proof that the authorities are aware of the future re-export and agree to it. 260 Again, there may be scope for harmonisation by means of a common prior consent to export clause and common lists of 'friendly countries' and 'prohibited weapons'. According to the GRIP Report, a majority of Member States would like to harmonise EUCs but do not share a common vision on how to approach the issue. 261 Ideas suggested by Member States include: a common model format of EUC annexed to the ICT Directive; a list of minimum essential elements to be included in an EUC on the basis of the guidelines of the User's Guide for example; or common rules on the use of EUCs, for example, when an EUC should be required and for which type of intra-Community transfers under general, global and individual licences. 262 Harmonisation does appear conceivable in light of relative agreement already achieved most notably in the User Guide.
In addition, the GRIP Report identifies that practices on ex-post controls vary between Member States, with a majority requiring a delivery verification certificate ("DVC") from the enduser as proof that the military items have successfully been imported, although, a DVC is often optional. 263 Further, several Member States do not require DVCs for transfers within the EU and, where required, these are only used under individual licences. 264 A minority of Member States have procedures for post-shipment end-use monitoring, often allowing the Member State of origin on-site inspections, although clauses to this effect are not included systematically and are quite rare in practice. 265 A crucial issue leading to many of these differences in law and practice is the lack of a common definition of what constitutes a 'sensitive product', since for these items the controls tend to be tighter and more diverse. 266 As indicated in Section 4 above, initiatives towards a common list of sensitive products or at the least clearer definition of a product's sensitivity could lead to greater harmonisation.
In addition, according to the GRIP Report, Member States do not seem to require an EUC for transfers under a general licence. 267 However, general licences are frequently subject to end-use limitations under art.10 ICT Directive. Article 10 provides that when a recipient of transferred defence-related products under licence applies for an export licence to export those transferred goods outside the EU, the exporting Member State must ensure that the recipient declares that it has complied with export limitations attached to the licence 268 to the extent that any export limitations are included. 269 More specifically, the recipient may be required by the originating Member State to obtain prior consent for export. 270 Thus, any export restriction on the defence good issued by the Member State of origin "follows the transferred good", 271 so that at the point of export at the common external frontier of the Community, the Member State in question knows and enforces the original export restriction. These export limitations include non-re-export clauses or notification clauses, "in order to maintain the coherence of their arms export policy". 272 Article 10 ICT Directive, and not surprisingly the implementing laws and practices of the Member States, do not appear to differentiate between the different situations in which general licences are to be used. Most importantly, in cases in which the end-user is a certified company without prospect of export, an end-use guarantee should not be needed. 273 Any such requirement is arguably disproportionate. It is submitted that art.10 ICT Directive should differentiate between the general licence situations on the basis of the understanding of certification as an alternative to end-use controls and be revised accordingly, for example, by adding the following sentence: "[n]o export limitations of any kind shall be attached to general licences in which the end-user is a certified undertaking." 274 Apart from facilitating administrative procedure and reducing delays, this would also strengthen the under-used certification regime of the ICT Directive discussed above by providing an additional incentive to get certified.
More generally, it has been argued that the ICT Directive lacks any systematic means by which receiving Member States are routinely informed about relevant re-export conditions. 275 Whilst it is the Member State's obligation to implement the provision, the recipient must ensure compliance and inform the authority of any export limitations. Consequently, the ICT Directive fails to safeguard against the risk of unauthorised export in cases where recipients intentionally or inadvertently neglect to inform their authorities. 276 Further, previous versions of the ICT Directive proposal had proposed consultation between Member States in the event that consent to re-export was required by the originating Member State but not obtained. However, the inclusion of a consultation obligation recognises the possibility for the re-exporting Member State to overrule an export limitation. The absence of a consultation requirement suggests that a re-exporting Member State cannot override export limitations. 277 However, it has been advised that in order to completely safeguard against the risk of re-exportation, the originating Member State should specify a consultation requirement in the case of sensitive transfers in order to avoid the possibility of an export limitation being overridden. 278 It has been suggested that such a requirement is necessary to prevent export decisions being focused in Member States that host companies working on system assembly. 279 It should be observed that the Commission also originally considered an I.T.
traceability database that would track all licences and their eventual export restrictions. However, this option was considered to be less cost-efficient than the information requirements finally adopted.
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Whilst the current uncertainty of art. 10 ICT Directive may be criticised, this provision must not be seen in isolation as the only available safeguard. As indicated in Section 6 above, certification is one means of addressing export control concerns. In addition, the ICT Directive contains provisions on customs procedures to ensure a further final check on exports and their conformity with relevant administrative formalities before leaving the EU. 281 Article 16 ICT Directive also requires Member States to lay down penalties for infringements, in particular, in the event of false or incomplete information being provided as regards export limitations.
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Concerning the latter, one criticism raised by UNISYS was that whilst the penalties prescribed by national legislation for export violations generally took the form of a fine or imprisonment (or both) in all Member States, the amount of the fines and duration of imprisonment differed considerably, as did their enforcement. Thus, characteristic of the absence of enforcement machinery in the ICT Directive, Member States continue to exercise considerable discretion on an important issue which continues to remain within the field of national procedural autonomy.
Safeguard measures: withdrawals, suspensions and limitations
The ICT Directive envisages the possibility for a Member State to enact suspensory measures in a number of scenarios. Firstly, as indicated in Section 6, the Member State of a certified recipient may take corrective action which includes suspension of a certificate where an instance of noncompliance has been determined to affect its reliability. 283 Secondly, art.4(9) is a general provision applicable to all licences according to which Member States may withdraw, suspend or limit the use of transfer licences issued at any time on four grounds: protection of their essential security interests; public policy; public security; and non-compliance with licence terms and conditions. Thirdly, art.15 which is solely applicable to general licences provides for a "safeguard measure" in which suspension may be imposed but only after a prior verification of the situation. Specifically, a Member State must first "consider" that one of three circumstances exists. These circumstances are: where there is a "serious risk" that a certified recipient in another Member State will not comply with a condition attached to a general transfer licence; public policy could be affected; public security could be affected; or essential security interests could be affected. Where a Member State considers one (or presumably more) of the circumstances to exist, they must first inform the Member State of the recipient and request verification of the situation. Importantly, therefore, whilst art.4(9) appears to apply where one of the above circumstances are present, art.15(1) is preemptive, concerning circumstances where there is a risk or possibility of one of the circumstances eventuating. Where "doubts" (i.e. a "reasonable doubt" 284 ) "persist" a Member State may then impose a provisional suspension. The suspending Member State must then inform the other Member States and the Commission of the reasons. The suspending Member State may also decide to lift the suspension where it considers that it is no longer justified. Again, similar to issues concerning measures to be applied to non-compliant certified recipients, variable national approaches may result to the determination of suspension. For instance, it is not clear what is meant by a "serious risk" and whether it must be possible or probable as well as what constitutes a "reasonable doubt" which "persists". Further, it is unclear to what extent verification will satisfy the licensing Member State especially if the recipient Member State has limited understanding of the underplaying the security threats. We have not yet reached the stage where full confidence in the export control policy of all member states can be endorsed. A system of checks and balances for arms export controls -not only for denials, but also for approvals -is therefore to be welcomed." 280 See CSWD, at 47. 281 Article 11(1) ICT Directive. 282 See also Recital 38 ICT Directive. 283 As referenced in art.9(4)(b) ICT Directive. 284 Recital 39 ICT Directive.
circumstances. There is also a risk that verification simply becomes a formality, suspension having already been determined on the basis of risk rather than evidence. In addition, the ICT Directive does not prescribe measures which may result after verification but which fall short of provisional suspension. Member States may also fundamentally differ as to when suspension, withdrawal or limitation of a licence is appropriate. Finally, art.15(2) authorises a Member to lift a suspension on a general licence where it considers that suspension is no longer justified. However, the ICT Directive contains no comparable provision with regard to the lifting of suspensions on global or individual licences. GRIP does not provide data on such measures but there is a risk of abuse which may be further exacerbated by the lack of a review system, to which this article now finally turns.
Review and remedies
National legal systems have traditionally provided a means to bring judicial review for the purposes of challenging export licensing decisions. 285 However, beyond existing provision under national law, the ICT Directive contains no specific provisions enabling, for example, a licensee to challenge decisions such as a Member States choice to only grant a particular type of licence, to refuse to grant a licence or the basis for suspending or revoking a licence or certificate. Rather, a Recital to the ICT Directive simply encourages the determination by Member States of effective and sufficient measures to ensure enforcement. 286 Whilst not entirely unequivocal, another Recital to the ICT Directive also indicates that Member States should determine the "recipients of transfer licences" in a non-discriminatory way unless necessary for the protection of their essential security interests.
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To this extent, the ICT Directive appears to envisage the possibility to challenge a Member State's decision where a recipient has been chosen on grounds which are discriminatory.
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By contrast, the Defence and Security Procurement Directive, has its own review and remedies system to challenge procurement decisions. 289 However, the review and remedies systems of the procurement Directives are a rare deviation from the EU principle of national procedural autonomy and which was not, in fact, originally included in the initial proposal. The position is also not directly comparable given that the review and remedies system is not new but modelled on the pre-existing provisions under the Public Sector Procurement Remedies Directive 89/65/EEC. Therefore, the harmonisation of review and remedies provision under the ICT Directive would have been new and ambitious.
Notwithstanding, it is submitted that existing national judicial review proceedings indicate that a basis for challenge potentially exists. The Defence and Security Procurement Directive indicates the potential for harmonisation of review and remedies in the field of defence trade. The courts can accommodate the special national security context of these challenges, as the Court of Justice has shown in the case law discussed above. 290 Further, the ICT Directive expressly incorporates reference to the use of penalties for violations which presupposes a basis for challenging those penalties. It is therefore suggested that progress be undertaken towards assessing the feasibility of incorporating specific provisions on review and remedies in a revised or future ICT Directive in order to further the "progressive building of mutual trust and confidence". 291 .
285 Some Member States provide for challenges. In Germany, for example, the rejection of an application for a global transfer licence or its withdrawal would always take the form of an 'administrative act' (Verwaltungsakt) and could therefore be challenged in the administrative courts with the possible annulment of the administrative act by that court. Similarly, export licensing decisions in the UK can be challenged by way of traditional judicial review in public law. 
Conclusions
Through the ICT Directive, the EU legislator has provided a series of options for both the national legislators of the Member States and their authorities in charge of armaments transfer licences. The latter are offered (1) a selection of general, global and individual licences, (2) certification, and (3) re-exportation controls. It is the introduction of global transfer licences and British-style general transfer licences which represent the main innovation of the instrument as they are likely to reduce costs and red tape and significantly improve security of supply. However, this paper has demonstrated that an export control mentality continues to permeate the very structure of the ICT Directive from limitations on mandatory exemptions from prior authorisation to export control limitations. Consequently, the ICT Directive is restrained in clearly defining the circumstances in which general, global and individual licences are required, permitted and prohibited, in turn creating a sense of ambivalence that is unlikely to instil confidence in its user communities. Beyond the legislative design, national practice post-transposition has raised or perhaps exposed for the first time a number of further divergences in national practice and which a revised ICT Directive should consider as institutional learning hones in on areas in need of greater harmonization through the Directive. These include: the scope of munitions lists, definitions of sensitive products under licence, the use of common licence conditions, common approaches to certification and remedial measures concerning suspension and revocation. Fundamentally, however, a key concern continues to be a sense of stalemate between Member States that are accustomed to their own licensing cultures and anxious to safeguard against re-exportation risks and the private sector cautious to calculate the costs, benefits and risks associated with a wholescale transition to general licences. Whilst changes to the legal framework cannot address these pressures, a bold approach towards harmonisation in a revised ICT Directive backed with institutional measures towards improved visibility and communication could at least go some way towards a more "licence friendly Europe."
